

## **Fact-Checking the Palestinian Nakba Narrative and Rejecting a Suicidal Path for the Free World**

by Michelle Marder Kamhi

Less than two months after the horrific events of October 7, 2023, one of my oldest and closest friends astonished me by adding her voice to the deafening chorus condemning Israel for its response, and pitying the innocent civilians suffering under it in Gaza. When I defended Israel, she indicated that she had many reservations about Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinians. Since I have always regarded her as reasonable and fair-minded, and I respect her intelligence, I begged her to tell me what facts had led to her view.

Her response was even more astonishing. Apart from conceding that October 7th was indeed a horrific act of terrorism by Hamas, against which Israel clearly has the right to strike back, the account she presented could have been lifted whole cloth from Al Jazeera or the Palestinian Authority. My American friend, an ostensibly “moderate” Democrat, had accepted virtually every major lie and distortion contained in the pro-Palestinian version of Israel’s history—from the claim that Israel had stolen land from Palestinian landowners to the allegation that Zionists had committed a massacre of innocent civilians in the Arab village of Deir Yassin.

What follows is my reply to her account in full. I publish it in the hope of reaching some of the many presumably reasonable people who share her view in whole or in part, with potentially disastrous consequences not only for Israel but for the U.S. and the entire free world.

Dear \_\_\_\_\_ ,

Your account would clearly discredit Israel in my eyes if it were accurate and didn’t omit crucially relevant mitigating circumstances in addition. As it is, however, it sadly reflects the distorted reporting and opinion emanating from mostly left-leaning media such as the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*<sup>1</sup>—which in effect promulgate the [Nakba](#) version of events Palestinians have fabricated to delegitimize Israel and represent themselves as the hapless victims of a great injustice.

Let me respond to each of your points in turn. The initial question of whether Israel’s response to October 7 is “too extreme” is best assessed in historical context. So I will skip over it for now to consider the historical matters you referred to.

### **1947–1948: UN Partition of Palestine**

Your statement that “conflict ensued on both sides” in response to the UN Partition Plan makes it sound quite even-handed. Yet you then proceed to list only alleged Jewish attacks on Arabs. And you later state: “Israel was the aggressor at its founding.” The truth is quite the opposite. It’s important to remember that Palestinian and non-Palestinian Arabs alike rejected the Partition Plan as soon as it was announced, and rather than negotiate, they immediately resorted to

violence. As indicated by the following excerpt from a [U.S. State Department account](#), they were the initial aggressors, not the Zionist settlers:

Fighting began with attacks by irregular bands of Palestinian Arabs attached to local units of the Arab Liberation Army composed of volunteers from Palestine and neighboring Arab countries. These groups launched their attacks against Jewish cities, settlements, and armed forces. . . . The goal of the Arabs was initially to block the Partition Resolution and to prevent the establishment of the Jewish state. The Jews, on the other hand, [merely] hoped to gain control over the territory allotted to them under the Partition Plan.

With the exception of Jerusalem (where Jews were in the majority) and the Negev desert (sparsely populated by Bedouins), allocation of land in the Partition Plan was based solely on the then-current demographic distribution. Though the land area granted to the Jewish state seems out of proportion to population, about 60% of it was Negev desert. Contrary to Palestinian claims, Arabs got most of the good agricultural land, including the religiously and historically crucial regions of Judea and Samaria in the West Bank.<sup>2</sup>

The Zionists had their own substantial reservations about both the fairness and the viability of the plan. The status of Jerusalem was of particular concern. Because of its multicultural population and significance, the city was placed under international jurisdiction in the Partition Plan. But that left [100,000 Jews](#) surrounded by mostly hostile Arab territory and isolated from the Jewish state. Nevertheless, Zionists opted to accept the plan and try to make the best of it. In contrast, the Arabs decided on a destructive course of perpetual resistance aimed at eliminating the Jewish state rather than on building their own.<sup>3</sup>

*The Massacre That Never Was: The Myth of Deir Yassin.* The source on Deir Yassin you got your information from apparently ignored a major book on the subject that was published a few years ago. The above-titled book, by Middle East historian Eliezer Tauber, was the product of exhaustive research by him to uncover the truth, which is vastly different from the myth—with regard both to the battle and to its exploitation for propaganda. It was not an arbitrary, unprovoked “massacre” of innocent women, children and elderly. It was an essentially military effort to secure a hostile Arab village that was blocking the delivery of aide to the besieged Jewish population of Jerusalem. Nor was there any evidence of rape or the other kinds of atrocities routinely committed by Arabs against Jews since the 1920s. Palestinian Arab propogandists deliberately distorted and inflated the incident in the hope of prompting surrounding Arab nations to support them. (For more on Tauber’s findings, see the *Commentary* magazine [book review](#).)

You claim that soon after Israel declared independence “Israeli forces took over large swathes of Palestinian territory, greatly increasing what the UN partition had mandated for a Jewish state and decreasing that for a Palestinian state.” Here again the picture you paint of Israel as the aggressor is belied by the [U.S. State Department account](#):

After Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948, the fighting intensified with other Arab forces joining the Palestinian Arabs in attacking territory in the former Palestinian mandate. On the eve of May 14, the Arabs launched an air attack on Tel Aviv, which the Israelis resisted. This action was followed by the invasion of the former Palestinian mandate by Arab armies from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. Saudi Arabia sent a formation that fought under the Egyptian command. British trained forces from Transjordan eventually intervened in the conflict. . . . After tense early fighting, Israeli forces . . . were able to gain the offensive.

. . . [F]ighting continued into 1949. Israel and the Arab states did not reach any formal armistice agreements until February. Under separate agreements between Israel and the neighboring states of Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Syria, these bordering nations agreed to formal armistice lines. Israel gained some territory formerly granted to Palestinian Arabs under the United Nations resolution in 1947. Egypt and Jordan retained control over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank respectively. These armistice lines held until 1967.

Thus the new territory that Israel gained control of in the 1947–1948 war was determined by military necessity and security concerns in response to Arab hostilities. And the land it retained control of after the war was agreed to in the armistice by the Arab belligerents.

In arguing that Palestinian Arabs got a raw deal under the Partition Plan, you focus on the hardships they claim they suffered by “disproportionate” loss of land and displacement. But you fail to consider why partition had been decided on in the first place. It was seen as the only way to end the decades of violence emanating from the militant Arabs’ unwillingness to tolerate any Jewish presence in the region. Just as the 1947 [partition of India](#) was seen as the most expeditious way to resolve Muslim-Hindu strife. Ironically, Arab nations officially approved that partition, although the number of Muslims displaced by it vastly exceeded the Palestinian displacement.

Moreover, the Nakba version of events you’ve embraced omits the crucially relevant fact that partition also precipitated the displacement of more than 800,000 Jews from Arab lands, where many of them had lived for millennia, long before the advent of Islam. All of their property was confiscated, and there was no possibility of return.<sup>4</sup> They constituted an even greater refugee problem than the displaced Palestinians, which was exacerbated by tens of thousands of European displaced persons and Holocaust survivors. The Jewish refugee problem was quickly solved, however, because Israel opened its doors to any Jew who sought entry, absorbing 688,000 persons in its tiny territory in the first three years of statehood.<sup>5</sup>

In contrast, the Arab world chose to create an ever-growing population of perpetual refugees, now preposterously in its [5th generation](#), rather than recognize the existence of the Jewish state. As Elliott Abrams recently [observed](#):

The Arab states have always held the key to solving the Palestinian problem. The Palestinian refugees could long ago have been resettled among their people in Arab lands, which extend over five million square miles. These nations have the land and money to rehabilitate the Palestinian refugees; Israel, with a fraction of Arab land and wealth, absorbed 820,000 Jews driven from Arab countries. . . . The Arabs' refusal to do the same with the Palestinians shows they are more interested in using the refugees as a political weapon against Israel than they are in truly solving the problem.

Most remarkably, you say nothing about the extraordinary circumstances that had led to the Zionist movement and the ultimate founding of Israel: *the millennia of persecution and expulsion suffered by the Jewish people, culminating in the Holocaust*. The creation of a Jewish state was quite reasonably seen as the only way to ensure their survival.

### **Pre-Partition Palestine: 1880–1948**

To fairly assess the current situation in Israel, it's crucial to understand the role played by Zionism in the half century or more leading up to statehood. When Zionist settlement of Palestine began, in the 1880s, it was a sparsely populated, largely desolate territory in which Arabs had been under the oppressive rule of Turks for centuries and owned relatively little land. The majority of the Palestinian Arabs were poor peasants, semi-nomads, and Bedouins, not landowners. About 80% of the territory was "state land," owned by the Ottoman Empire (and later controlled by the British); much of the remainder was held by absentee landlords. The condition of the resident Arab peasant farmers (*fellaheen*) was especially precarious; among other problems, they had long been at the mercy of violent incursions by Bedouin tribes (though, ironically, they were fellow Arabs).<sup>6</sup>

Early Zionists had no intention of forcibly expelling Arabs from the hoped-for [Jewish homeland](#). Jewish settlers neither seized nor stole any land. They acquired tracts only through voluntary sales, mainly from the absentee landlords. To avoid displacing resident Arabs—in particular, the *fellaheen*—Zionists deliberately sought land that was largely uncultivated, swampy, sandy, and uninhabited, for which they often paid exorbitant prices.<sup>7</sup>

Nor did Arabs entertain any ideas of Palestinian statehood in the early years of Zionist settlement. Despite stirrings of nationalist feeling among Arab intellectuals in the second half of the 19th century, a full-blown Arab nationalist movement did not emerge until the second decade of the 20th century, with the [Great Arab Revolt](#) against the Ottoman Empire during World War I. It was originally conceived as an explicitly *pan-Arab* movement, however, which envisioned one nation encompassing all the Arab-speaking countries of the Middle East—not separate nation-states such as Iraq, Syria, and Palestine.

A crucial turning point was the 1917 [Balfour Declaration](#), expressing British support for "the

establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” Though the idea of restoring the Jewish people to the Holy Land had been advocated by prominent non-Jews during the 19th century (such as George Eliot in her remarkable 1876 novel *Daniel Deronda*<sup>8</sup>), Balfour was the first public statement of support for the Zionist cause by a major political power.

Significantly, Balfour initially won the support of quite a few prominent Arabs. Most notable was Emir Faisal I, a leader of the Arab Revolt that had helped the British drive the Ottoman Turks out of Palestine—in exchange for which they had been [promised political independence after the war](#) to enable them to form an Arab state. In a 1919 agreement with Chaim Weizmann and other Zionist leaders, Faisal warmly endorsed the fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration, as “the surest means of working out the consummation of their national aspirations is through the closest possible collaboration in the development of *the Arab State and Palestine* [emphasis mine].”<sup>9</sup>

In a related letter to Felix Frankfurter, who headed the American Zionist delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, Faisal wrote:

We Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement. Our deputation here in Paris is fully acquainted with the proposals submitted yesterday by the Zionist Organization to the Peace Conference, and we regard them as moderate and proper. . . .  
 . . . The Jewish movement is national and not imperialist. Our movement is national and not imperialist, and there is room in Syria for us both.<sup>10</sup>

Palestinian Arabs who shared Faisal’s positive view even formed pro-Zionist organizations, which collaborated with Jewish Zionists to promote the cause during the 1920s. For example, in July 1921, when a delegation of anti-Zionist Palestinians went to London to try to stop the implementation of the Balfour Declaration, Hasan Shukri—mayor of Haifa and president of the pro-Zionist Muslim National Associations—sent a telegram to the British government stating:

We strongly protest against the attitude of the said delegation concerning the Zionist question. We do not consider the Jewish people as an enemy [whose] wish is to crush us. On the contrary. We consider the Jews as a brotherly people sharing our joys and troubles and helping us in the construction of our common country. We are certain that without Jewish immigration and financial assistance there will be no future development of our country as may be judged from the fact that the towns inhabited in part by Jews such as Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, and Tiberias are making steady progress while Nablus, Acre, and Nazareth where no Jews reside are steadily declining.<sup>11</sup>

But militant Arabs soon gained the upper hand. In 1919, Haj Amin el-Husseini (the Palestinian Arab who would become their political leader under the British mandate, and later [allied himself](#) with the Nazis) began organizing small groups of *fedayeen* (“self-sacrificers”—precursors of today’s suicide bombers) to terrorize Jews and drive them out of Palestine. In subsequent years,

the militant Arabs under his influence intensified their practice of anti-Jewish attacks and rioting.<sup>12</sup>

It is telling that, in a 1930 article in the *Atlantic* dealing with the Arab-Zionist conflict, an American journalist highly sympathetic to the Arab cause nonetheless observed:

In any attempt to describe the local state of Palestine to-day, it would be most ungenerous to fail to emphasize that Jewish penetration . . . has in many senses benefited the Arab inhabitants of the country. Pre-war Arab standards of life in Palestine were extremely low, even for the East. Arab ideas of agriculture were primeval; education was practically non-existent; the sciences were neglected, and trade was conducted on parochial and primitive lines. Zionism has undoubtedly changed the exterior of Arab life. It gave the Arabs new and more hygienic conceptions of well-being and comfort in their daily existence; it introduced competition which induced a more modern outlook both in agriculture and in politics; and it moved them to bestir themselves educationally and commercially.<sup>13</sup>

To appease the militant Arabs, however, British authorities made a series of concessions. Among others, they not only placed limitations on land purchases by Jews but also drastically limited Jewish immigration (while Arab immigration was allowed to proceed freely). From the late 1930s until Israel's founding, the draconian British immigration policy denied admission to hundreds of thousands of European Jews trying to escape the Holocaust. Many of them perished.

### **The 1967 Six-Day War and Lebanon Invasions (1978–1982)**

Among Israel's alleged aggressions, you include the Six-Day War and the 1978 and 1982 invasions of Lebanon. But astonishingly, you nowhere mention the ongoing barrage of deadly actions and hostile threats that provoked them, or the underlying ideological elephant in the room. In effect, the Palestinians and their Arab allies had declared permanent war on Israel at its inception by their [categorical refusal to accept the existence of any Jewish state](#), regardless of its borders, in the region. As a result, Israel has been living under a constant state of siege since its founding. Yet you consider armed checkpoints and mass surveillance “immoral.” How else would you protect Israeli citizens from the ever-present threat of terrorism?

Your objection to Israel's launching invasions of Lebanon to expel the PLO from the territory implies that you either approve of the PLO ( [Palestine Liberation Organization](#)) or are ignorant of its nature. It was created by the [Arab League](#) in 1964 to serve as the official representative of Palestinian Arabs. Its founding [Covenant](#) lay exclusive claim to a “homeland” in Palestine (thereby denying the far deeper historical and religious claim to it by Jews), and declared “Arab unity” in a “holy war” of “armed struggle” to drive Zionists out. Prior to the 1993 Oslo Accords, militant factions of the PLO pursued the policy of ongoing terrorist acts implied by its charter, staging them both within and outside Israel (such as [those from Lebanon](#) and the infamous hijacking of the [Achille Lauro](#) cruise ship). It was therefore officially designated as a terrorist group by the U.S.

## **Palestinians and Hamas**

You say that your “extensive research indicates the majority of Palestinians do not support Hamas” and you argue that, unlike Hamas, “most Palestinians are not looking for the complete destruction of Israel.” President Biden [has made](#) the same fundamental mistake. The truth is that Palestinians not only [elected](#) Hamas—whose terrorist tactics were well known by then—to represent them in 2006 (after Israel had voluntarily vacated the Gaza strip, [forcibly removing](#) Jewish settlers who protested). They still largely support them. Two polls conducted by Arab research groups after October 7 indicated substantial Palestinian approval of Hamas’s actions.<sup>14</sup> Various [earlier polls](#) have also shown that, in general, most Palestinians favor armed struggle and terrorist activity over peaceful coexistence and negotiation.

Moreover, the recent survey responses indicated that if a new election in Gaza were held today, Hamas would probably remain in power. Support for Hamas is even stronger in the West Bank (where it originated) than in Gaza. Finally, in [one of the recent polls](#) an overwhelming majority (85.9%) of respondents rejected the principle of coexistence with Israel, and 74.7% supported the creation of a Palestinian state “from the river to the sea”—which would mean the elimination of Israel.

In addition, there is [appalling evidence](#) that Palestinian civilians not only enthusiastically celebrated the October 7 atrocities but actively participated in them in considerable numbers.

### **Is Israel’s response to October 7 “too extreme”?**

Experts who are genuinely informed regarding the situation in Gaza firmly oppose the widely held view that Israel’s response is “too extreme,” perhaps even amounting to “genocide” (as South Africa and Turkey are now outrageously charging in the ICJ). To begin with, the fatality figures often cited are notoriously unreliable and grossly inflated.<sup>15</sup> John Spencer, who heads urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point, has written a [series of articles in \*Newsweek\*](#) arguing that the civilian casualties are much lower and that “The IDF has gone to unprecedented lengths . . . to abide by the laws of war and avoid harm to civilians, even when doing so puts [its] own soldiers at risk.” He has further [testified](#):

In my long career studying and advising on urban warfare for the U.S. military, I’ve never known an army to take such measures to attend to the enemy’s civilian population. . . . [B]y my analysis, Israel has implemented more precautions to prevent harm than any military in history—above and beyond what international law requires and more than the U.S. did in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Spencer’s view is resoundingly [echoed](#) by Colonel Richard Kemp (a retired British military expert), as well as by a broad consensus of the professionals in two forums on the subject.<sup>16</sup>

Such informed defenders of Israel understand that the IDF response to October 7 can only be

properly assessed in relation to the unprecedented nature of their enemy. Hamas not only openly flouts the most basic principle of ethical warfare in its terrorist strategy of heinous attacks on Israeli civilians and the taking of civilian hostages. It deliberately exploits its own civilian population by embedding itself in residential areas and in presumably protected public facilities such as schools and hospitals. That is why Kemp rightly argues that “every single [Palestinian] death [in this war] is the direct responsibility of Hamas, not of Israel.”

Most unprecedented is the role of Hamas’s vast network of tunnels. Given its placement, it constitutes a uniquely formidable defense. Rivaling in extent the London underground—which afforded welcome shelter to civilians during the Nazi blitz—Hamas’s tunnel system is estimated to be large enough to shield the entire civilian population of Gaza from attack. But it serves a diametrically different end. While providing almost impregnable security to Hamas, it intentionally leaves the civilian population maximally exposed—in the expectation that the higher civilian casualties are, the more likely it is that international pressure will be exerted on Israel to cease fire. As Spencer [emphasizes](#):

Almost all of Hamas’s tunnels are built into civilian and protected sites in densely populated urban areas. This complicates discriminating between military targets and civilian locations—if not rendering it entirely impossible—because Hamas does not have military sites separate from civilian sites.

As that analysis makes clear, it is impossible for Israel to eliminate Hamas without seemingly “extreme” civilian casualties and massive physical destruction. Truly informed and impartial observers such as Spencer and Kemp understand, however, that it is crucial for Israel to finish the job. Anything less would be a significant victory for Hamas over Israel, enabling its survival to wreak future havoc, and inspiring other terrorist groups. Of wider import, it would also constitute a major triumph for Hamas’s sponsor, Iran, in its jihad against Western values as epitomized by Israel (the “[Little Satan](#)”) and the U.S. (the “[Great Satan](#)”).

You fear that Israel’s response “is guaranteed to promote hatred for the Jews among Palestinians that heretofore had not been there.” As I’ve indicated above, and [Einat Wilf](#) (a prominent Israeli on the center left of the political spectrum) has [compellingly documented](#), however, that hatred was baked into the cake decades ago. It has been reinforced by teaching a generation of Palestinian school children that their highest aspiration in life should be to “kill Jews.”

Moreover, the unspeakably barbaric events of October 7—whose victims were in communities known to be home to some of the strongest Israeli advocates of Palestinian rights—have resulted in a remarkable “[sobering of the Israeli left](#)” on the issue. They now recognize that a two-state solution to the Palestinian problem, which they had long and vigorously sought, is (and always has been) impossible—because, absent a sea change in their cultural mindset, the Palestinians would never accept Israel’s existence.

## **The Real Nakba**



As I've indicated above, the truth about Israel's past history and present reality reveals countless lies contained in the Palestinian Nakba version of history that purportedly justifies the "Free Palestine" anti-Zionist protests on America's university campuses and in major cities around the world.

A key part of Israel's present reality that I haven't touched on is its complex demography. Remarkably, about 2.3 million (26 percent) of the Israeli populace are non-Jews, mostly descendants of the 150,000 Palestinian Arabs who opted to remain in 1948. Although primarily Arabic-speaking, they comprise five culturally distinct subgroups. All have full civil rights, and Arabic is an official language in Israel as well as Hebrew.<sup>17</sup>

Though the media tend to focus on disgruntled "[Palestinian citizens of Israel](#)," many Arab Israelis have a story to tell very different from allegations of "apartheid." One is the Christian Arab-Israeli journalist and social activist [Yoseph Haddad](#), who [compellingly refutes](#) that allegation. Another is [Ishmael Khalid](#)—who went from a tent-dwelling, sheepherding childhood in a poor Bedouin village in Galilee to high ranks as an Israeli diplomat. He has written:

I am a proud Israeli—along with many other non-Jewish Israelis such as Druze, Bahai, Bedouin, Christians and Muslims, who live in one of the most culturally diversified societies and the only true democracy in the Middle East. Like America, Israeli society is far from perfect, but . . . [b]y any yardstick you choose—educational opportunity, economic development, women and gay's rights, freedom of speech and assembly, legislative representation—Israel's minorities fare far better than [in] any other country in the Middle East.<sup>18</sup>

In that light, I would argue, the real Nakba for the Palestinian people was not partition but their own much earlier choice to pursue an intransigent course of violent resistance to the creation of a Jewish state rather than work toward peaceful coexistence.

### **What should be done now?**

First of all, our foreign policy should be based on an informed, clear-eyed assessment of both our adversaries and our allies—not on ignorance and [hollow consensus seeking](#). The facts enumerated above should serve to show why Israel merits the unstinting moral and material support of the U.S. and the entire free world in its struggle against Hamas and Iran's other terrorist proxies. It is ultimately a struggle against Iran itself—a nation that is not only ruled by a fanatical Islamist theocrat intolerant of all "infidels" but also presents a rapidly growing nuclear threat.

In particular, as the free world's presumed leader, the U.S. should not undermine its vow of ironclad support for Israel in the battle to eliminate Hamas by withholding arms if steps aren't taken that would actually ensure Hamas's survival. Moreover, it should promptly deliver the high-powered weapons needed for Israel to remove the escalating existential threat of Hezbollah from Lebanon.

Instead of joining those who claim that Israel is not doing enough to protect civilians, the U.S. should lead by trumpeting to the world John Spencer's expert assessment that the IDF has reduced civilian casualties for urban warfare to "historically low levels,"<sup>19</sup> though it has meant higher IDF casualties.

Instead of advocating a ceasefire before Hamas has been totally defeated (as the latest proposal announced by President Biden does), the U.S. should inform the public why such a ceasefire would ultimately serve the interests of Hamas and Iran, not the free world's.

Nor should there be any more talk of a two-state solution for the Palestinians, much less of involving Hamas or the like-minded [Palestinian Authority](#) in any negotiations on Gaza's future. Yet, incredibly, the Biden administration [has been envisioning one](#) in which a "revitalized" Palestinian Authority (possibly combined with whatever remains of Hamas) would be in charge of Gaza's future government.

Last but not least, the U.S. should lead the free world by consistently standing in firm opposition to the blatantly biased views and judgments of the "international community" as reflected in the United Nations regarding Israel and Palestine.<sup>20</sup> For more than a decade, the U.N. has been seeking to gain official recognition of Palestine as a state. That effort recently succeeded, with 144 of the 193 U.N. member states voting in favor, although Palestine has never fully functioned as a state and clearly fails to qualify as one under generally accepted international law codified in the 1933 [Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States](#).<sup>21</sup>

The recent decision by free-world countries such as Ireland, Norway, and Spain to also recognize Palestine as a state is astonishing. It not only serves to legitimize the Palestinians' violations of free-world norms at the expense of Israel, which abides by those norms; it also ignores the suicidal implications of such a move for themselves as predominantly Christian countries. Since 80% of the Palestinians approve of Hamas, there is little reason to doubt that, if empowered by such international recognition, they would use it to fulfill what militant Arabs have long been declaring in Arabic: "First comes Saturday, then comes Sunday"—by which they mean: "On Saturday we kill the Jews, on Sunday we kill the Christians."<sup>22</sup>

The international community's anti-Israel bias is especially glaring in the rulings of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), both of which play fast and loose with legal and ethical principles as applied to Israel.<sup>23</sup> Especially outrageous is the ICC's recent request for arrest warrants against Netanyahu and the Israeli Minister of Defense—which treats their actions as the moral equivalents of those of the Hamas leaders who planned the October 7 massacre. It thereby violates a fundamental principle in the proper ethics of warfare, which distinguishes between the intentional targeting of civilians (in this case, by Hamas) and unavoidable collateral damage in a just war (by Israel).

To his credit, President Biden has opposed the international courts' rulings against Israel. But the terms of his subsequent ceasefire proposal (which he deceptively claimed had been offered by

Israel) are clearly more favorable to Hamas than to Israel. Most crucially, hostilities would be ended before Israel had entirely eliminated Hamas from Gaza. Any remnant left in place would surely reconstitute to wreak havoc again.

Biden's reference to the increased "isolation in the world" that Israel would suffer if it rejected the proposal seems to imply that such isolation is justified. In view of the international community's demonstrable anti-Israel bias and colossally defective judgments, however, Netanyahu is right to ignore its demands in general, and to reject the recent ceasefire proposal in particular—as well as to [castigate the Biden administration](#) for its slow walking of weapons previously approved and urgently needed for Israel's inevitable war against Hezbollah, a far more formidable adversary than Hamas.

Given the track record (in fair-minded assessments) of Israel and the IDF, and their deep understanding of the complex circumstances, I trust that the course they choose to pursue is most likely in the end to prove best not only for Israel and the rest of the free world but also for any Palestinians who are sane enough to reject Hamas and its murderous ideology.

## Notes

*This article was originally published (without links and endnotes to sources) on [x.com](#) on October 6, 2024.*

1. See these well-documented articles: "[New York Times Failures in Israel Coverage Point to Larger Bias](#)," "[The NYT Misrepresents the History of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict](#)," and "[How the Washington Post Abandoned Basic Journalistic Standards Covering the Israel–Hamas War](#)."
2. "[The Partition Plan: Background & Overview](#)."
3. [Mitchell Bard](#), "[Myths & Facts: Partition and the War of 1948](#)."
4. Andrea Mifano, "[The expulsion of Jews from Arab countries and Iran – an untold history](#)."
5. "[The Mass Migration to Israel of the 1950s](#)."
6. Moshe Aumann, "[Land Ownership in Palestine, 1880–1948](#)," Rohr Jewish Learning Institute.
7. See sources cited in "[Is it true that Israel stole Palestinian land?](#)," IsraelAdvocacy.net. Arguments by libertarians such as Stephen Halbrook to delegitimize Israel because its land was "stolen" from Palestinian Arabs are highly dubious. For example, Halbrook ("[The Alienation of a Homeland: How Palestine Became Israel](#)," *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, Fall 1981, 357–374) claimed that because *fellahin* had been dispossessed by absentee landlords from land subsequently sold to Zionists that it had been stolen from them and cannot belong to Israel. He would thus penalize the Jewish state for an injustice committed by Arab elites on their underlings, not by Zionists. Is that just?

8. "[Daniel Deronda - the first Zionist novel](#)" is a very illuminating talk on the subject given by [Yanky Fachler](#) at Ireland's Jewish Museum.
9. "[Emir Feisal - Chaim Weizmann Correspondences \(January 1919 – March 1919\)](#)," Center for Israel Education, citing 1944 Congressional Hearings as its source. The wording here differs slightly but crucially from the version widely circulated on the internet (which reads "the Arab states and Palestine"); it is more clearly consistent with Faisal's pan-Arab vision. (Faisal stipulated that his adherence to the terms of the agreement was contingent on British fulfillment of the promise of independence—which of course never happened.)
10. Faisal's letter to Frankfurter is included in the above-cited correspondences.
11. Hasan Shukri, quoted in Hillel Cohen, *Army of Shadows* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), p. 15. See also the in-depth review of Cohen's book by Middle East historian Benny Morris: "[The Tangled Truth](#)," *The New Republic*, May 7, 2008.
12. Jacqueline Shields, "[Arab Riots of the 1920's](#)," *Jewish Virtual Library*. See also Benny Morris, "[The NYT Misrepresents the History of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict](#)," *Quillette*, February 27, 2024. Although terrorist acts were committed by some Zionists during the mandate in response to Arab aggression or harsh British restrictions, they were never condoned by the majority. And once statehood was achieved, such fringe tactics were abandoned. In sharp contrast, polls show that most Palestinians approve the use of terrorism to achieve political ends.
13. Owen Tweedy, "[Zionism in Palestine](#)," *The Atlantic*, October 1930.
14. [Arab World for Research and Development, Wartime Poll](#) (Oct 31–Nov 7); [Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll No. 90](#) (Nov 22–Dec 2). Both polls were in 2023. A new poll by the Palestinian Center, [No. 92](#) (May 26–June 1, 2024), indicates that more than 60% of Gazans report losing family members in the current war, two-thirds of the public nonetheless continue to support the October 7 attack. The poll also shows increased support for Hamas and armed struggle, as well as decreased support for a two-state solution.
15. "[Gaza Fatality Data Has Become Completely Unreliable](#)," *Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, March 26, 2024. David Adesnik, "[Gaza Health Ministry Cannot Provide Names for More Than 10,000 It Says Have Died](#)," *Foundation for Defense of Democracies*, May 2, 2024.
16. "[The Laws of Armed Conflict and Ethics in the Israel-Hamas War](#)" and "[Hamas vs. Israel: Ethics of War](#)." See also "[Israel Is Succeeding in Gaza](#)," by Andrew Fox, a retired British Army officer with relevant experience.
17. "[Minority Communities in Israel](#)" and "[Latest Population Statistics for Israel](#)."
18. Ishmael Khaldi, "[Lost in the blur of slogans](#)," *Sfgate*, March 4, 2009. See also "[Meet the Arab Zionists](#)" and "[Arab Muslim Speaks About Her Life in Israel](#)."

19. John Spencer, "[Israel Has Created a New Standard for Urban Warfare. Why Will No One Admit It?](#)," *Newsweek*, March 25, 2024.
20. See, for example, Robert Williams, "[Big Lies About Israel](#)," Gatestone Institute, July 3, 2024.
21. Kavitha Giridhar, "[Legal Status of Palestine](#)."
22. Lela Gilbert, "[Saturday People, Sunday People, and Americans at Risk](#)," November 30, 2023; and Pierre Rehov, "[First Comes Saturday, Then Comes Sunday](#)" (2007 documentary film).
23. Greg Rose, "[Why ICC's ingrained bias ensures no fair 'trials' for Israel](#)," May 24, 2024.